Despite the seemingly rock-solid achievements of some individual sciences, science as a whole is affected by storms that may reshape it within a generation. Books such as Devlin's Goodbye Descartes1 a title that no reputable scientist would have thought sensible until recently are now almost commonplace. They all declare that we are reaching, or have reached, a stage at which the scientific consensus worked out in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries by Descartes himself, Bacon, Galileo and Newton has taken us nearly as far as we can go unless it is radically revised. The physicists probably started the whole trouble with their discovery that matter, space and time are not at all as the 'century of genius' (i.e. the 17th century), building on classical Greek foundations, had taken them to be. Medicine, in so far as it is an applied science, is unlikely to escape these storms; and one direction in which disturbances may be brewing lies in the newly fashionable area of consciousness studies. Apart from a brief flowering at the end of the 19th century, this field had lain almost entirely fallow until about twenty years ago.
There is, of course, no agreement yet as to the nature of consciousness, nor even about whether there is sense in regarding conscious experience as 'a something' that could in principle be amenable to explanation. The philosopher Dennett2, for instance, has made quite a strong case for regarding it as a sort of illusion. Another influential philosopher, Chalmers3, has divided problems of consciousness into the 'hard', which mostly concern how it is that we experience feelings or perceptual qualities such as redness, and the 'easy', which centre on questions that should be fully answered by neuroscientists in due course. Many neuroscientists suppose that answers to the hard questions will likewise emerge from their studies, consciousness itself, they say, being simply an emergent property of some sorts of complex neural activity. Francis Crick, who has been interested in these questions since leaving DNA studies to others, takes this position4. Roger Penroses, or Hut Although there is no agreement on fundamental questions, some common threads are beginning to emerge. One of these is the realization that the content of anyone's consciousness depends on contextual factors as much as, or more than, on his or her brain considered as an isolated systeml 7. To give a specific example, Hutchins8 has shown that the cognitions involved in individual acts of ship navigation can be fully understood only in terms of entire cultural histories and contexts. It seems natural, then, to ask whether some diseases could be due solely to disordered cultural contexts since the term 'consciousness' is synonymous with our experience of ourselves and the world, and there are illnesses whose main manifestations appear to be based on disordered experience. Maybe, in order to reach a complete understanding of illness, enthusiasm for the physical techniques of immunology, biochemistry, brain imaging, and so on, will have to be supplemented by cultural and anthropological methods. This is hardly a new idea, of course. The 'psychosomatic' approach to disease has always had a following and has often included rather broad psychosocial concerns under its umbrella. However, the new interest in conscious experience may revitalize the whole approach and lend it a precision not always apparent hitherto. This is a point best illustrated by specific example. One might suppose that any illnesses that are primarily diseases of consciousness would already have firmly been placed in the category of 'psychiatric', but this is not necessarily the case, nor can we safely assume that psychiatric illnesses are more likely than many other types of illness to be based mainly on contextual factors instead of on organic dysfunction. From our point of view, it is pretty obvious that the dancing manias of the Middle Ages9 were manifestations of 'mass hysteria' based on complex, culturally sanctioned beliefs about the efficacy of dancing which were most transparent in the case of tarantism (dancing was regarded as the only cure for the otherwise inevitably fatal bite of the 'tarantula' spider, an all but invisible beast that initially lived only in Apulia in Italy, though its habitat expanded as its fame grew). Yet contemporaries had various theories about these disorders ranging from the medical (they were physical illnesses) to the theological (they were manifestations of diabolic possession). What illnesses cause us similar puzzlement?
Well, one could suggest a whole range of possible examples, but the best are the fatigue syndromes, since they have such a well-documented history and have been subject to so much attention lately. They are based on ideas that gained wide currency in society between about 1660 and 1860. Given in roughly the chronological order in which they appeared, these are:
(a) Weakness is the main symptom of some poorly understood illnesses (b) There are illnesses to which talented and sensitive people are particularly prone (c) Illnesses of type b are NOT psychiatric (d) Rest is a good cure (e) Illness has environmental causes Wesselyl0 has described how these ideas coalesced and came to form the basis of 'neurasthenia', a very popular disease at the end of the nineteenth century which was identified by a neurologist named Beard writing first in 1869 and then at greater length in 1880. A similar condition, 'effort syndrome', was described in 1871 by da Costa, a physician'1. It contained ideas a, c, and d, but b referred to a physical elite rather than to those with special talents of mind, while the notion of the existence of a subtle (and undetectable) heart lesion was substituted for e. The popularity, and very probably the prevalence, of neurasthenia gradually declined over the first years of the twentieth century as faith in the invariable truth of its component ideas wavered. Effort syndrome underwent a faster eclipse as the subtle heart lesion causing it remained obstinately undetectable despite improved clinical methodology, and people came to question whether it really existed. Both conditions were reprieved for a time by their frequent occurrence in First World War servicemen, but after the War they seemed likely to die out. When neurasthenia reappeared it did so in epidemic form, most famously as 'Royal Free disease', in the context of widespread anxiety over poliomyelitis epidemics. As fear of polio subsided, Royal Free disease became endemic and acquired a range of alternative names-postviral fatigue syndrome, myalgic encephalomyelitis (ME), and so on.
Wesselyl0 has pointed out, however, that ME is based on exactly the same ideas as neurasthenia, the commonest interpretation of e being that an unknown virus is the environmental cause.
Accounts of illness like that sketched in above have tended to lack credibility. In the case of ME itself this has been blamed on the effectiveness of the tireless propaganda put out by the ME Society which vehemently affirms the truth of the notions on which the condition is based (though they do, in our egalitarian age, rather play down b). But the credibility problem goes much deeper than this and has to do with the consistent efforts over several centuries of science in general to ignore consciousness and to concentrate on 'objective' phenomena-efforts that reached their apogee in the behaviour of the behaviourists and are now crumbling. If consciousness had to be side-lined, how could it be allowed a central role in accounting for 'scientific' concepts such as particular diseases? Now that conscious experience is being let back on stage, it is a safe bet that there will soon be mathematical models to describe fluxes and coalitions of ideas that will throw much light on ME and a range of other illnesses; the obscure allergy syndromes that come and go, as well as the eating disorders, are obvious candidates for at least partial explanation along these lines. There is not much danger that we shall ever become biomedical technicians only; changes in science itself should ensure that a wider role will remain.
